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STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE'

Inflation and the Real Growth of State and Local
Government Expenditures
By R o y B a h l a n d J o r g e M a r t i n e z - V a z q u e z *

Inflation was perhaps the major problem
facing state and local government finances as
the 1980s began. Double-digit inflation rates
throughout much of the late 1970s had driven
up the unit cost of providing government
services, and because tax bases had not kept
pace, an increase in nominal tax rates and
cutbacks in public service levels were alleged
to have resulted. This paper gives some
structure to the discussion of inflation im
pact on government budgets by formulating
a general economic model that separates au
tom atic from discretionary responses, and
identifies the relative price, income, and bud
get effects of inflation. We also estimate the
impact of these three components on the real
expenditures of U.S. state and local govern
ments during the past two decades.
I. Conceptual and Measurement Issues

Several strands of the public finance liter
ature have picked up on the importance of
inflation as a determinant of the growth in
government but none, we argue, have asked
the most im portant question: “ What is the
mechanism by which inflation affects the real
dem and for state and local government ex
penditures?”
How does one measure the inflation to
which a government will respond? Different

f Discussants: Robert P. Inman, University of Penn
sylvania; Michelle J. White, University of Michigan;
H ow ard Chem ick, H unter College.
'D e p a rtm e n t of Economics and Policy Research
Program , College of Business Adm inistration, Georgia
State University, A tlanta, GA 30303. We are indebted
to R obert Inm an for a num ber of helpful comments on
an earlier draft, and to Michael Jordan for his research
assistance.

deflators are called for depending on whether
the purchaser is viewed as a government unit
or as a taxpayer (Peter Heller, 1981). There
is also the choice between an implicit price
deflator or a fixed-weight deflator. The first
overestimates the effects of price changes on
government purchases and the second un
derestimates them. Neither is an appropriate
deflator for transfer payments.
Most studies of the determinants of state
and local government expenditures have used
cross-section data, ignoring the inflation
issue (Thomas Borcherding and Robert
Deacon, 1972). Research on the determi
nants of long-run changes in government
expenditures takes inflation explicitly into
account, but these studies have been
straightforward empirical testing. Studies for
C anada (Richard Bird, 1979) and the United
States (Morris Beck, 1985) show that when
the government expenditure-GNP ratio is
“ appropriately” deflated, a smaller real ex
pansion in the public sector is observed. This
provides some evidence of a relative price
effect, but because no underlying theoretical
structure is presented, and because auto
matic and discretionary changes are not sep
arated, it is difficult to understand how
inflation induces changes in government be
havior.
Only a few studies have taken on the more
explicit objective of comparing the impact of
inflation on the revenue and expenditure
sides of state and local government budgets.
David Greytak and Bernard Jump (1975)
measured the potential expenditure and rev
enue responses to inflation in the 1970s, but
under the assumptions that the level and mix
of inputs would remain constant, that tax
bases would fully respond, and that no dis
cretionary changes would take place. They
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found that the purchasing power of state
and local government revenues eroded by
about 10 percent. Attiat Ott (1983) included
discretionary as well as automatic changes,
adjusted purchases and revenues by “ ap
propriate” deflators, and concluded that in
flation, during the 1969-79 period, appeared
to generate “ tax dividends.”
O ther studies have analyzed the narrower
question of the impact of nominal income
growth on state and local government rev
enues and found an elasticity greater than
unity (Daniel Feenberg and Harvey Rosen,
1986). John Ross and Richard Reeder (1979)
estim ated the relationship between revenues
and the implicit price deflator, holding con
stant the nominal G N P gap, and found that
revenues were 6 -1 6 percent higher than they
would have been in a noninflation world
during the 1973-76 period.
Where this research has found, and left,
the state of what we know about inflation
im pacts can be summarized as follows: (a)
inflation may induce increases in the relative
price of government goods and services, but
since government revenues will also be driven
up, it is not clear whether the revenue or
expenditure stimulation will dominate; and
(b) there is some uncertainty about whether
(and how) discretionary tax rate changes,
and borrowing and expenditure retrench
ment should be counted as an impact of
inflation.
II. The Model

A stylized model of the local and state
subsector is developed here to explore the
different ways in which inflation may impact
real expenditure growth. We assume two
types of agents, voters and bureaucrats. Vot
ers are assumed to be sovereign in that they
determine the level of public goods, and,
with some time lags, the composition of
taxes. Bureaucrats are assumed to minimize
the production costs of public goods, and
they administer the jurisdiction’s debt that is
issued to purchase capital goods. Bureau
crats can only deviate temporarily from vot
ers’ wishes by, for example, spending rather
than rebating federal government transfers.
Over the longer run, for given prices and
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disposable incomes, voter preferences are the
only determ inant of the jurisdiction’s expen
ditures. This fairly standard median voter
model treats grants as a lump sum addition
to personal income, and total disposable in
come is expressed net of federal income
taxes.1
Given the desired level of public goods,
the tax rates are set by the jurisdiction’s
managers to generate either a balanced bud
get or a surplus. Because adjustment in tax
rates may take place with a lag, and because
of the balanced budget constraint and the
prohibition against financing current expen
ditures with debt, it may be necessary for the
jurisdiction to supply a disequilibrium level
of public goods until tax rates can be ad
justed. Such a disequilibrium situation is less
likely to occur when the reserve position of
the local jurisdiction is strong.
We assume that in production the elastic
ity of substitution of capital for labor, capi
tal intensity, and the rate of technological
change are all smaller for the public good
than for the private good and housing (Wil
liam Baumol, 1967). The initial equilibrium
in public and private goods will not be dis
turbed if all prices and nominal values (in
comes, transfers and debt, etc.) continue to
increase period after period at the same rate,
if the federal income tax is indexed to infla
tion, and if the real level of grants is held
constant. It is highly improbable, of course,
that all rates of change in nominal values
will be the same in a generalized inflation
environment. More likely, inflation is accom
panied by changes in the relative price of
factors of production and therefore of public
vs. private goods (Beck; Bird). The interest
in this paper is in this more general condi
tion, and in particular with three effects: (a)
an autom atic real income effect that comes
about because of the progressivity of the
federal income tax and the inflow of federal
grants; (b) an automatic relative price effect
that is due to differential inflation rates for
state and local government sector goods and

lA full specification of the model (which includes
public goods, private goods and housing) is available
upon request from the authors.
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services vis-a-vis housing and other private
goods; and (c) the discretionary changes that
the income and price effects call forth. Our
goal is to disentangle these three effects.
Even if a taxpayer’s nominal income keeps
up with inflation, his real purchasing power
can be decreased by a progressive federal
income tax that is not fully indexed. Since
state and local public services are not infe
rior goods, this will cause a reduction in the
real dem and for government revenues. The
other com ponent of the real income effect is
federal grants, which can partially offset the
effects of income tax bracket creep. This
model assumes that such offsets occur on a
dollar-for-dollar basis and there are no
“ flypaper” effects associated with grants.
In a generalized inflation environment, it
is almost certain that some prices will in
crease faster than others. In particular, in
flationary expectations can lead to wage in
creases in excess of the general inflation rate.
Relatively larger labor shares, lower rates of
labor productivity improvement, and lower
elasticities of substitution of capital for labor
make it much harder for the state and local
sector to absorb labor cost inflation. We
assume in this model that inflation drives up
wages by m ore than the general rate of price
increase, hence the marginal cost of provid
ing government goods increases by more than
that for private goods. This increase in the
relative price will lead to a decrease in the
dem and for government goods and services.
W hether this will be accompanied by an
increase in desired expenditures depends on
the price elasticity of demand.
The third effect is the impact of discre
tionary actions and institutional constraints
on the actual level of public services pro
vided. One view is that government units are
able to adjust optimally via a combination of
autom atic and discretionary responses, to the
relative price and real income effects induced
by inflation. Here, taxes are a veil and rates
simply adjust as needed. Another view is
that institutional frictions constrain taxes
from fully adjusting in the short run and
th at the actual real expenditure levels ob
served at any moment in time may not be
equilibrium levels. A “ budget effect” can be
defined as the difference between the opti

M A Y 1990

mal quantity of public services demanded
and that which is finally provided. Examples
of friction are provided by lagged property
value reassessment or the omission of ser
vices from the sales tax base. Together with
a balanced budget requirement, and the po
litical or legal limits to discretionary rate
changes, the jurisdiction will have to settle
(temporarily) for a quantity of the public
good that is smaller than that desired.
The size of the budget effect will be influ
enced by two factors. The first is the income
elasticity of the tax bases, ceteris paribus, a
greater effect might be expected from com
munities relying more heavily on the prop
erty tax. The second is the size of the net
indebtedness of the community. The budget
effect will be smaller if, for example, the
community is holding a surplus on which
they may draw to reach desired expenditure
levels.
III. Empirical Results

Annual data from the National Income
and Product Accounts are used here to test
for the presence of these three effects over
the 1972-88 period. To capture the behavior
of real expenditures over the sample period,
we consider two definitions of the dependent
variable. The first includes all expenditures
on goods and services, transfers to individu
als and interest payments. The second in
cludes only government purchases. Both
measures are deflated by the fixed-weight
price index of state and local governments.
Changes in real expenditures over the
sample period reflect the impact of inflation,
but they also reflect changes in the determi
nants of real demand which take place inde
pendent of inflation. The determinants we
take into account here are population and
personal income. We control for population
growth by measuring the dependent variable,
and where appropriate, the explanatory vari
ables, in per capita terms. To control for
income changes, we use per capita personal
income deflated by the fixed-weight price
index for personal consumption as an inde
pendent variable.
The explanatory variable for relative prices
is measured as the ratio of the fixed-weight
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price indices for state and local government
purchases and for GNP. The real income
effect of inflation due to federal income taxes
and grants is represented in the regression
equations by two separate explanatory vari
ables: per capita federal income taxes de
flated by the fixed-weight price index for
personal consumption expenditures, and per
capita federal grants-in-aid deflated by the
fixed-weighted price index for state and local
government purchases. The hypothesis is that
inflation will erode increases in nominal in
come because of bracket creep and the fed
eral income tax variable will therefore be
negatively related to real expenditures, but
that increases in federal grants will stimulate
real demand.
To capture the presence of the budget
effect, we use the net liability position of the
state and local government sector lagged by
one year. The variable is measured in per
capita terms and deflated by the fixed-weight
price index for state and local government
purchases of goods and services. Net liability
of state and local governments is defined as
total debt outstanding minus financial asset
holdings in the Flow of Funds Accounts,
and in this analysis excludes assets or liabili
ties of the pension and retirement funds. The
hypothesis here is that the budget effect,
ceteris paribus, will be weaker to the extent
the financial asset position is stronger. Be
cause this variable is specified as net liabili
ties, the coefficient should be negatively
signed.
Since the explanatory variables include the
relative price, estimation is by two-stage least
squares (2SLS) using the state and local
government compensation of employees
fixed-weight price index and the AAA mu
nicipal bond rate as additional instruments.
From the different specifications we tried,
the log-linear specification performed best,
and is reported in Table 1. The DurbinW atson coefficients do not suggest a serious
problem with autocorrelated errors, and a
Cochrane-Orcutt adjustment left the esti
mated equations practically unchanged.
All coefficients take the expected sign and
are statistically significant at the 5 percent
level. After controlling for population and
real personal income changes, the three ef-

T a b l e 1 — 2SLS R e g r e s s i o n E q u a t i o n s :
R e a l P e r C a p it a E x p e n d it u r e s f o r
t h e S t a t e a n d L o c a l S e c t o r , 1972-88*

Explanatory
Variables
Relative Price
Per capita real
personal income
Per capita real
federal income tax
Per capita real
federal aid
Per capita real
net liabilities.
lagged one year
Constant
Adjusted R 2
D- W Statistic
/•"-Statistic

Total
(1)

Purchases
(2)

—1.83
<3.08)b
0.95
(2.68)°
-0 .4 4
(4.27)b
0.23
(2.84)c
—0.21
(3.15)b

-2 .2 2
(3.17)b
0.89
(2.14)c
-0 .4 0
(3.32)b
0.30
(3.19)b
-0 .2 2
(2.79)c

12.12
(2.92)c
0.886
2.14
25.93

11.61
(2.86)c
0.703
2.12
8.57

“All variables in logarithms. Absolute value of /-sta
tistics in parentheses. Dependent variable: Per capita
real expenditures.
bSignificant at the 0.01 level by a two-tail test.
‘Significant at the 0.05 level by a two-tail test.

fects that potentially are caused by inflation,
and developed in our model, appear to have
played a significant role in the determination
of real growth in the state and local govern
ment sector in the 1 9 7 2 -8 8 period.
The coefficients for the relative price effect
indicate the existence of an elastic response
of per capita real expenditures. Previous esti
m ates of price elasticities in the literature
have been in the inelastic range, but these
estimates were obtained from cross-section,
disaggregated data, with nominal (as op
posed to real) measures of expenditure, and
considered the own-price rather than the rel
ative price effect. The coefficient for personal
income shows real demand to be income
inelastic although the elasticities are near
unity.
The real income effect is as expected in
that federal tax liabilities take on a negative
sign, and grants are directly related to the
level of expenditure. Given the presence of
bracket creep and the declining level of real
grants over much of the period under study,
the real income effect dampened the demand

no
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for state and local government expenditures.
However, taken at mean values, the esti
m ated marginal propensity to spend on state
and local government services is higher for
federal grants-in-aid than for personal in
come. This finding is more consistent with
the flypaper effect than the fungibility model
assumed here.
The net liability variable has the expected
negative sign. When the financial position of
the sector is weaker, the observed level of
real expenditures is lower. This finding is
consistent with our hypothesis about the ex
istence of a “ budget effect,” due to frictions
that slow the adjustment process. It is also
consistent with the argument that there is a
“ wealth effect” that will cause the median
voter to demand a higher level of expendi
tures.
IV. Summary and Conclusions

While the previous literature on role of the
inflation in determining the real growth of
state and local government budgets has con
tributed to our understanding of several
measurem ent issues, it has failed to provide
an adequate framework to sort out the state
and local government response to inflation.
Analysts and policymakers alike seem to be
confused over whether inflation should be
viewed as a fiscal bonus with dominating
revenue effects, or as primarily a cost matter
and an im portant contribution to fiscal dis
tress. In this paper we develop a stylized
model of state and local behavior and iden
tify three effects of inflation on the real
dem and for state and local government ser
vices: a relative price effect, a real income
effect, and a budget effect. The budget effect
measures disequilibrium between actual and
dem anded levels of expenditure, and it
should be present only when necessary dis
cretionary adjustments do not take place. In
these situations, the budget process is not a
veil and has a real impact on demand. Tests
for the presence of the three effects, using
annual data for state and local governments

for 1972-88, give results that are consistent
with the model developed here.
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